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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DALE \V. CORBRIDGE and
DARLENE CORBRIDGE,
Paintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
M. MORRIN AND SON, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.

10853

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she
fell into a construction excavation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with appellant's
statement of facts except as hereinafter qualified
or amplified.
1

The detour signs installed by the def end a t,
h
n °'
t e south end of the detoured area were approxi~
mately 100 yards south of the excavation rathei
than two or three hundred yards as indicated br
appellants. The detour signs consisted of a sign wi ~
hash marks, a "Road Closed" sign, and a ''Detou~. :
sign. See the copies of photographs attached to dEfendant's memorandum (R. 14). Also south of tht
detour signs were two signs marked "Keep Leff'
and "Slow". All signs had flashing yellow lighb
mounted on them. (Dep. p. 16).
At the time plaintiff stopped her automobile
she did observe the detour signs ( Dep. p. 12) and
she knew she was in the detoured construction area
(Dep. p. 7-8). She was familiar with the area tu
the extent that she knew this area of the highway
had been detoured for construction purposes and
that there was a two-lane detour road around the
construction area which she had driven over earlier
that day on her way to Lagoon ( Dep. p. 7). The
detour road was marked with lights to show its
course (Dep. p. 16).
The headlights of plaintiff's automobile were
working properly when she stopped it inside the
construction area facing in a northerly direction,
but she turned the headlights off before she started
walking to the north through the construction area
( Dep. p. 10). She had no estimate of the distan~e
she walked after leaving her automobile because it
was too dark. She could see nothing in the direction
2

she ·was walking except the taillights of the automobile on the other side of the consfruction area
( Dep. p. 11). She could not see the ground or where
she was putting her feet ( Dep. p. 12-13).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

\Vith i·espect to the law regarding summary
judgment cited by plaintiffs, we have no quarrel.
The citations ai·e general statements recognized by
all courts i·egarding this doctrine. However, they
are not helpful with respect to the specific issue, i.e.,
v;as the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
in walking into a construction area of unknown
characte1· in darkness which was so complete that
she vvas unable to see where she put her feet or any
of the large objects in the area where she walked.
Her conduct was tantamount to walking off into an
unknown area blindfolded. The complete lack of visibility is documented in several places in the transcript of plaintiff's deposition. The following testimony recorded on Pages 11 and 12 of her deposition
are examples:
PAGE 11.

"Q.
A.

Do you have any estimate of how far
you walked from your car to where this
accident happened, where you fell?
No sir· I couldn't because it was dark
'
out' there.
3

Q.

Could you see anything at all as
walked along there?
Yut

A. Not in the direction I was going ex ,

ce:n

for her red lights.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

Di~ you see any lu~1ber or building n"

tenal or anythmg hke that?
No, sir.

ln-

Did you see any at the time you wei·t
there?
No, I didn't.
PAGE 12.

\Vas it so dark you couldn't see where
you \Yere putting your feet?
Yes. In fact, when I was down in the
hole it was so dark I couldn't even see
my hand in front of my face. When I
looked up I couldn't see the top of the
hole. It was real dark and the wind waf
blowing quite a bit out there.

*

*

*

You didn't see any lumber stacked or any
lumber forms or any debris at all?
A. Not in front of me; no, sir.
Q. You just started walking in the dark?
A. ( N odcling her head up and down.)
Q. You couldn't see the ground and all of a
sudden your feet went out from under
you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir."
Regarding the negligence of persons venturing
into construction areas where they are not author4

izerl to be, the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, 123 Utah
453,decided by the Utah Supreme
Court in 1953 is very much in point. In that case,
:he plain tiff admitted the following facts in his opening statement to the jury. Ogden City, through its
contractor, had dug a trench along 18th Street in
front of plaintiff's residence and had not provided
any way for plaintiff to cross the trench in front
.1f his home. At about 2 :30 a.m. on the day of the
accident, plaintiff and his wife were returning home
after Yisiting. It was extremely dark, there being
iw street lights in the irnmediatee vicinity. Rather
than walking one-half block around the construction
area, plaintiff attempted to cross the trench and
was injured when he fell into it. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for non-suit at the conclusion of plaintiff's opening statement.
~70, ~58 P.2d

This Court affirmed the trial court's action in
stating:
''Under such facts we believe plaintiff
was contributorily negligent and also assumed a known risk precluding recovery as a matter of law, denying no constitutional right to
a jury trial.

* * *

"Plaintiff's conduct, aside from concept
of assumption of risk, was unreasonable in
the light of this known hazard and the existence of a convenient, hardly burdensome detour at the intersection of Grant and 18th
Street, where the trench ended, and through
which plaintiff had driven shortly before his
5

injury. To deliberately attempt to cross u d
such circumstances seems to be that t ~: r·:·
lack of due care not attrib~t~ble to the ~\·di~'.~
ary prudent person exerc1smg care fol' h;,
own safety."
"
The instant case is very similar. Althou I'
plaintiff may not have known the exact nature ~f
the hazard contained in the construction area, shl
was put on notice that there was danger of some
kind there because of the fact that the highway had
been detoured and an alternate temporary road hacl
been provided over which the plaintiff had traveled
earlier that day.
A quite similar case factually is the Kentucky
case of Barrick11ian vs. Louisville, 167 S.W. 151
where a pedestrian plaintiff was injured by walking
into a pile of planks about one foot high stacked on
a drive-way leading into the street. A warning light
had been sitting on the pile of planks earlier in thE
day but was not burning when the plaintiff collided
with it. She had passed the area ear lier in the ewning with friends by walking along one side of the
street which was used as an unpaved sidewalk
However, when they returned, the walk area was
muddy and so plaintiff and her friends decided tn
walk in the street and in walking out into the driveway, plaintiff struck the obstruction and was injured. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant which was affirmed on appeal by the Ken·
tucky Supreme Court which stated:
"In this case appellant knew the street
I
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was closed to traffic; she lived only a few
blocks away; she had seen these obstructions
a few short hours before with the danger signal hanging on them; and if, with the knowledge of ~hese facts, to escape the slippery and
muddy sidewalk, she chose to use the driveway which she knew was closed for traffic,
and was thereby injured, there can be no recovery."
In the case at bar, the plaintiff admittedly
knew of the detour, having passed over it a few
hours before; and on her return trip she stopped
her car just north of the detour sign at the south
end of the construction area. For some reason best
known to herself, the plaintiff elected to attempt
ro walk through the construction area rather than
along the detour road provided by the defendant.
The following cases, although dissimilar as to
whe1·e the reported accidents occurred, show quite
cleal'ly that the law in Utah does not permit one to
walk into an unlighted or unseen hazard, whether
indoors or outdoors, and then recover damages for
injuries sustained as a result thereof.
In Ternpest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299
P.2d 124, ( 1956) plaintiff, as a social guest attempting to find the bathroom in defendant's home,
mistakenly opened a door leading into the basement
and fell down an unlighted stairway. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in the fallowing language:
7

"Had appellant exercised ordinary a
reasonable care for her own safety, she wou1~
not have ope!led a door ai:d stepped into,
dark a~d unhg~ted are.a with which she wa~
unaquarnted, without first ascertaining what
was beyond the door even though she had not
been told that the room to which she was go
ing was lighted."
··
In Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 278, 333 P.2d
630 ( 1959), the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries she sustained in falling into an unrailed and unlighted stairwall in the garage portion of defendan t's home. Plaintiff had seen the stairway approximately ten months prior to the accident, but temporarily forgot about it at the time of the accident.
The trial court entered judgment for defendant and
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on
the basis that the facts showed the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In this regard the Court stated:
"We have discussed the contentions as to
defendant's primary negligence merely to indicate our doubts as to its existence. But it
is unnecessary to resolve the issue as to whether a jury question existed in that regard
because of the view we take of contributory
negligence. It supports the trial court's dire.ction of a verdict against the plaintiff, as will
presently appear.
"Plaintiff says that although she had
prior knowledge of the stairwell she could not
be charged with negligence as a matter of Ia:v
for walking into the open stairwell beca:iise m
the darkness it was a hidden danger m the
8

area where she might reasonably be expected
to enter the house because of the implied invitation; and justifies her failure to be aware
of it by the fact that her mind was preoccupied by the wedding plans and that it had
been ten months since she had seen it. In that
regard she is confronted with a dilemma: she
either had in mind the existence of the stairwell 01· she did not. If she did, she was obliged
to guanl against the known hazard; if she did
not she is met with the principal recently affinnecl by this court in the case of Tempest
vs. Riclwrdson that a guest could not enter
heedlessly into the darkness into an unknown
area and then complain of dangers there encountered.''
And in Henry vs. Washiki Clitb, Inc., 11 Utah
:Zcl 1:38, 355 P.2d 973 ( 1960) the plaintiff sued to
recover for injuries sustained when he fell down a
darkened stai1·well while looking for a rest room in
the back of defendant's tavern. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court cited the negligent conduct of
the plaintiff in the following particulars:
"Instead of inquiring, or observing at
the north end of the tavern where the rest
rooms were, he went to the south end of the
tavern proper, through some swinging doors
in to a room which he said was so dark he
could hardly see at all, and groped his way
along for about 25 feet, through another, and
fell down a stairway."
Also, in the case of Morris vs. Farnsworth Mo9

t:z,

123 Ut~h 289, 259 P.2d 297, cited by the plain.
tiff, the f ai.lure to use what illumination was rea.
sonably available was held to be negligence. In th
case the plaintiff while occupying one of defendan:~
motel uni ts walked from his bed toward the bath.
room and stubbed his toe on a chair which had been ,
moved into his path of travel by defendant's em.
ployees earlier in the day. This court held that if the
room was sufficiently lighted so that the plaintiff
could or should have seen the chair, then he was
negligent in not exercising reasonable care to ob.
serve it; on the other hand, if that portion of tht
room was so dark that he could not see an object
such as a chair, "due care would have required him
to turn on a light."
In the instant case the plaintiff testified that
her automobile headlights were working normally
(Dep. p. 10) when she stopped in the construction
area after pulling around the detour signs, but
that she turned the light off and did not turn them
back on before she started walking in a northerly
direction through the construction area. The automobile was facing in the same general direction
(north) as the plaintiff's path of travel; she testified, "the detour sign would be south of my car, I
guess, because I was facing north, going north"
( Dep. p. 8). Yet the plaintiff failed to turn her
automobile headlight "on" before walking off into
the dark construction area where she was subsequently injured.
10

Defendant agrees that prior knowledge of a
dangerous condition to which one exposes himself
and is the1·eby injured does not necessarily constitute negligence. However, a person who for some
reason must subject himself to a dangerous condition must also take extra precautions to counter the
known danger. If such precautions were those that
a reasonably prudent person would take under the
circumstance, such a person would not necessarily
be negligent even though he was injured by the dangerous condition. This principal is well stated in
J.I.F.U. 15.3:
"Inasmuch as the amount of caution used
by the ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion to the danger known to be
involved in this undertaking, it follows that
in the exercise of ordinary care, the amount
of caution required will vary in accordance
with the nature of the act and the surrounding circumstances. To put the matter in another way, the amount of caution required
by the law increases, as does the danger that
reasonably should be apprehended."
However, in this case the plaintiff took no extra
precautions to protect herself from the hazards of
walking off into a known construction area in complete darkness. She did not even turn on her automobile headlights.
Likewise, the doctrine of momentary forgetfulness urged by the plaintiff is not applicable since
plaintiff was not injured as a result of a momentary encounter with a harmful agency such as a
11

hi?"h voltage power line as was the situation in th
Bickhmn vs. Southern California Edison, 263 p ~
2
32, and Aiistin vs. Riverside Portland Cement Co.1)1.c
pany, 282 P.2d 69, cases cited by plaintiff as auth.
ority for this proposition. In the instant case tho
two physical factors which contributed to plaintiff'; ,
accident were the darkness and the detoured con.
struction area. Plaintiff could hardly contend that
she forgot it was dark or that she forgot she was
walking in a construction area. In fact, she deliber.
ately chose to walk through the construction are 2.
rather than around it on the detour road provided
for that purpose.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY IN WALKING INTO THE CONSTRUCTION AREA IN COMPLETE DARKNESS.

Defendant submits that under the criteria set
forth in Clay vs. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d
1075, the plaintiff Darlene Corbridge in the instant
case assumed the risk of being injured in leaving
the portion of the roadway prepared for travel and
walking into the construction area in complete darkness. The Clay vs. Dunford case at page 181 sets
forth the following requirements which must be met
before the doctrine applies. They are: ( 1) the plaintiff must have looked; (2) she must have seen; (3)
she must have known of a danger, and ( 4) she must
have voluntarily subjected herself to the danger.
In the instant case, there is no question but
12

that the plaintiff looked and saw the detour signs
which routed traffice around the construction area.
There is also no question but that she voluntarily
chose not to use the prepared detour road but to
walk through the construction area. Therefore, the
real question is whether as a matter of law she
knew of the risk involved in walking through the
construction area in complete darkness. The plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she knew construction was going on in the area but "figured
they were working on the road and this is all that
impressed me." ( Dep. p. 7). It is assumed that she
did not know the exact nature of the construction
vroject or of the excavation into which she fell.
However, on the other hand, she would be chargeable \Vith the knowledge that there were hazards
and obstructions in the road construction area. Otherwise, there would be no reason for the detour.
The real question is then whether or not the
dangers one may encounter in leaving a prepared
roadway are specific enough to invoke the doctrine
of assumption of risk. In the early case of Herdon
vs. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 65, 95 Pac. 646, the
plaintiff was traveling with a team and heavy buggy south on 12th East Street and desired to turn
west on 2nd South Street. In so doing, the plaintiff
made a wide turn and drove his team into the untraveled center portion of the intersection where
one wheel of the carriage went off an embankment.
There were no barricades blocking off the portion of
13

the intersection not prepared for travel. The pl ;
a,n.
"ff
h
ti
was t rown out of the carriage and injurell ·
He stated he did not make a sharp turn becaus h"
was a f ra1"d the team would get away from him do,e1~;f
the steep grade of the hill. The jury found for th
plaintiff, but the Supreme Court reversed an~,
granted a new trial for errors in the trial court's
instructions. The court at page 81 indicated what
it considered to be a proper instruction regarding
one who departs from the traveled portion of th'
roadway in stating:
"We think further that the facts in this
case are such that the court should have instructed the jury that it was the duty ofre.
spondent to pursue the traveled portion of the
street, or that part which was worked and
prepared by the city for travel and that if he
departed therefrom intentionally or heedlessly for his own convenience, or for other reasons dependent upon his own volition, he assume the risk in doing so. It is not the law
that a person driving on the streets in all
parts of the city may at will depart from the
traveled track either by day or night, and if
he encourters a nabiral or artificial obstruc·
tion and suffers injury that he may recover
damages from the city." (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, plaintiff not only departea
from the roadway prepared for travel, but did so in
complete darkness. All of the elements o~ assu~p·
tion of risk mentioned above are present m the rn·
stant case. The plaintiff saw the detour sign (she
had previously seen the detoured area in the day·
14

lio·ht on he1· ti·ip to Lagoon) and she voluntarily
walked into the construction area in darkness. The
cases do not hold that one must anticipate the actual
object vv-ith which they may collide or the exact manner m which they may be injured or the severity
thereof before they are guilty of assumption of risk.
All that is required is that they realize a risk is invoh·ed and voluntarily subject themselves to it. The
doctrine as defined for our use in Utah is stated in
JIFU 17 .1, as follows:
[;b

"One is said to assume a risk when he
voluntarily exposes himself to that danger
or when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care would know, that a danger exists in
either the conduct or condition of another, or
in the condition, use or operation of property,
and voluntarily places himself or remains in
the position of danger."
Defendant submits that the plaintiff knew, or in
the exercise of ordinary care should know, that it
would be dangerous to walk into a road construction
area when it was so dark she could not see the
ground upon which she was walking or other substantial objects in the vicinity.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF \VAS NOT CONFRONTED WITH
A SUDDEN EMERGENCY SITUATION.

The fact that plaintiff was confronted with a
distressing situation does ont constitute a "sudden
emergency" in law so as to relieve her of the duty
of exercising due care for her own safety. The
15

emergency doctrine is based on the need for 81 dd
t"
. h
.
t e11
ac ion wit out time for thoughtful consideration oi ·
alternative courses. On this point, Prosser on Torts
Second Edition, at page 137 states:
"
"Eniergency. The courts have recognized
that an actor who is confro~ted with a sudden·
emergency may be lef~ no time for thought, or
may reasonably be disturbed or excited and
so cannot weigh alternative C?~rses of action,
but must make a speedy decision which will
be based very largely upon impulse or in:
stinct. He cannot be held to the same conduct
as one who has had an opportunity to reflect'
even though it later appears that he made th;
wrong decision ....

"The 'emergency' doctrine is applied onlr
where the situation which arises is sudde~
and unexpected and such as to deprive the
actor of all opportunity for deliberation .... '·
The question in this case is not whether the
plaintiff exercised due care in not walking on the
detour road, but whether she exercised due care in
walking off in to the construction area in complete
darkness. Plaintiff takes the position that an alter·
native choice was required between walking on the
detour road or walking through the construction
area. Such is not the case. Plaintiff could have asked
the motorist who stopped to assist her to send aid
and she could have then remained in her car until
aid arrived; or she could have flagged down another
motorist and asked for a ride from the beginning
of the detour, after advising her children of her in·
16

tentions; 01· she could have walked south along the
paved highway and sought aid in that direction. She
did not act in haste or upon impulse. As stated in
her deposition, she talked briefly with the driver of
the car who stopped to assist her and she then walked back to her own automobile to reassure her children before she started walking through the construction area. ( Dep. p. 8-9).
The circumstance of being confronted with a
stalled automobile does not require one to make an
instantaneous decision. Rather, the ordinarly prudent person would be inclined, if not forced, to sit
down and think "what do I do now". This is the
typical situation where one must weigh various alternative courses of conduct and has ample time in
which to do so.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY AT DEPOSITION
IS A PROPER BASIS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Plaintiff urges that summary judgment should
not be granted until after the trial court has heard
all of the evidence. However, in the Wold case,
snpm, the trial court did not hear all of the evidence
as indicated in appellant's brief. To the contrary,
the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case after the
opening statement without actually hearing any of
the evidence. In the case at bar, the trial court had
before it the sworn testimony of the plaintiff given
at the time of her deposition. As set forth above, her
17

testimony establishes that she was guilty of neg]i.
gent conduct which contributed to cause the injuries ·
for which she seeks to recover. Therefore, since hei·
right to recover is negated by her testimony already
of record, there is no purpose in receiving furthe;, ·
testimony which cannot alter that which has alread\ '
been elucidated, i.e., that the plaintiff, without con;.
pulsion, voluntarily walked into a known construe.
tion area, from which she knew traffic had been detoured, in complete darkness and into an open exca.
vation.
If the right of the plaintiff to recover is showr
to be non-existent, summary judgment should be
granted to avoid expending the time, effort, and
expense that would be involved in holding further
proceedings. Abdillkadir vs. Western Pacific Ran.
road C01npany, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339; Con·
tinental Bank vs. Cunningham, 10 Utah 2d 329, 353
P.2d 168. The propriety of exercising the summary
judgment procedure at pre-trial was affirmed in
Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395
P.2d 918, wherein the plaintiff stated in his depo·
sition that he stepped into an open elevator shaft
because he opened what appeared to be an ordinary
door which he assumed to be an outside exist ana
stepped sideways, making about a three-quarter
turn to close the door behind him. On the basis of
18

this testimony at his deposition that he was not looking in the direction which he stepped as he went
through the door, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and the judgment ·was afffrmed by this Court on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that
the plaintiff deliberately and voluntarily walked
into a known detoured construction area in darkness
so complete that it obscured the ground on which she
vrnlked and substantial objects in the vicinity. She
was not subjected to threat of immediate or imminent danger which would require her to make a hasty
or impulsive decision. To the contrary she had ample
time and opportunity to make a deliberate choice
regarding he1· subsequent conduct. However, she
then walked into the construction area where she
had no right to be and where defendant had no duty
to anticipate that she would be. The detour signs
had already warned her of the limits of authorized
travel around the construction zone. Defendant submits that reasonable minds could not differ in finding that an ordinarily prudent person would, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known
that it was imprudent to walk into a known construction area in darkness so complete that the plaintiff could not see where she was placing her feet.
19

